

## Community resources

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*courage is contagious*

## Viewing cable 04ANKARA362, AMBASSADOR'S LUNCH WITH DSHOD BASBUG, JANUARY 19, 2004

If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the [structure of a cable](#) as well as how to [discuss them](#) with others. See also the [FAQs](#)

### Understanding cables

Every cable message consists of three parts:

- The top box shows each cable's unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
- The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
- The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables ([browse by origin](#) to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.

To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this [WikiSource](#) article as reference.

### Discussing cables

If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at the paragraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags **#cablegate** and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. **#04ANKARA362**.

Reference ID	Created	Released	Classification	Origin
04ANKARA362	2004-01-21 04:44	2011-08-30 01:44	SECRET	Embassy Ankara

Appears in these articles:

[www.tanea.gr](#)

This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 ANKARA 000362

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/20/2014

TAGS: [CY](#) [IZ](#) [PGOV](#) [PINS](#) [PREL](#) [TU](#)

SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR'S LUNCH WITH DSHOD BASBUG, JANUARY 19, 2004

REF: A) STATE 012103 B) STATE 010120

(U) CLASSIFIED BY AMBASSADOR ERIC EDELMAN. REASONS:1.5(B) AND (D)

¶1. (S) AMBASSADOR HOSTED TGS DEPUTY CHIEF GENERAL ILKER BASBUG TO DISCUSS THE PM'S FORTHCOMING VISIT TO THE U.S., NORTHERN IRAQ AND CYPRUS C NOTED THAT HE HAD SAID THAT THE U.S. HAD ONLY REQUESTED TROOP ROTATION OUT OF IRAQ NOT IN. IN REVIEWING THE DOCUMENTATION EARLIER ON JANUARY 1 REDEPLOYMENT FROM IRAQ.

¶2. (S) GENERAL BASBUG NOTED THAT VCJCS GENERAL PACE HAD INDICATED THAT THE TGS MIGHT EXPECT A GROUP TO VISIT AND DISCUSS POSSIBLE ACTIONS WITH TO THE FACT THAT THE U.S.G. HAD DESIGNATED KONGRA-GEL AS A TERRORIST ORGANIZATION LAST WEEK. BASBUG NOTED HE WAS AWARE OF, AND PLEASED BY, THE

¶3. (S) BASBUG MOVED QUICKLY TO A DISCUSSION OF IRAQI FEDERALISM WHICH HE HAD ADDRESSED IN HIS JANUARY 16 PRESS CONFERENCE. HE NOTED THAT HE HAD EXPRESSED A TURKISH VIEW THAT FEDERATION WAS NOT A BASBUG AGREED BUT SAID, "IT IS A VERY TRICKY ISSUE BECAUSE ETHNIC AND GEOGRAPHIC LINES TEND TO OVERLAP A LITTLE IN IRAQ." BASBUG ASKED WHETHER

¶4. (S) AMBASSADOR RESPONDED THAT THE U.S. BELIEVED THAT IRAQIS NEEDED TO WORK OUT THE CONSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS AND THE GOVERNMENTAL SYSTEM THAT THEY WOULD ALL HAVE TO LIVE UNDER. GIVEN KURDISH DE POINT BUT NONETHELESS SAID THAT WHATEVER ARRANGEMENTS WERE AGREED MIGHT HAVE UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES THAT COULD THREATEN TURKEY'S INTERESTS. E THAT TENSIONS WOULD INCREASE AS THE MARCH MILESTONE FOR A TRANSITIONAL FUNDAMENTAL LAW APPROACHED. AMBASSADOR CAREFULLY REVIEWED POINTS IN REF

¶5. (S) ON CYPRUS, BASBUG MAINTAINED THAT PRESS STORIES ABOUT DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE TGS AND MFA ON THE ISSUE HAD BEEN GREATLY EXAGGERATED. WAS AN IMPORTANT OBJECTIVE AND THAT THE MAY 1 CYPRUS EU ACCESSION WOULD MAKE EVERYTHING MORE DIFFICULT. HE SAID THE TGS HAD TWO DIFFICULTIES. PRINCIPLES OR ESSENTIAL TRADE-OFFS" AS HE HAD REPORTED TO THE UNSC. TURKEY'S CONCERNS (MORE BIZONALITY, THE PERCENTAGE OF GREEK CYPRIOTS RETUF

¶6. (S) AMBASSADOR NOTED THAT IT WAS PRECISELY PAPADOPOULOS' RETICENCE ON A REFERENDUM THAT GAVE TURKEY AN OPENING TO GET ITSELF OUT OF A COF MEETING BUT ALSO ON THE COMMITMENT CONVEYED TO THE UN SYG BY THE PM ABOUT HIS DETERMINATION TO REACH A SETTLEMENT AND TAKE ADVANTAGE OF THE OPE

¶7. (S) BASBUG SAID THE TGS WAS VERY DISAPPOINTED AT THE TIMELINE THAT THEY WERE WORKING ON. HE AND HIS COLLEAGUES HAD HOPED TO WORK OUT THE TURKISH POSITION AND DISCUSS IT WITH THE U.S. AND THE U.K. TRADE-OFFS. BASBUG SAID HE APPRECIATED AMBASSADOR'S DISCUSSION WITH HIM OF PREPARATIONS FOR THE PM'S VISIT. HE ASKED, AS HE DEPARTED, WHETHER AMBASSADOR HAD SHARED THESE POINTS WITH ANYONE ELSE.

¶8. (S) COMMENT: BASBUG WAS, AS USUAL, QUIET, THOUGHTFUL AND UNDERSTATED. NONETHELESS HIS PREOCCUPATION WITH DEVELOPMENTS IN IRAQ WAS CLEAR. WHEN AMBASSADOR ASKED WHETHER CYPRUS OR IRAQ WAS THE MORE IMPORTANT CHALLENGE FOR THE TGS HE REPLIED "BOTH ARE

EDELMAN